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Significant numbers of multinational corporations ("MNCs")
from the European Union ("EU") operate in the African, Caribbean
and Pacific ("ACP") countries. The ACP countries are attractive
operational bases because of the enormous availability of raw
materials, low cost of labour, and favourable regulatory
frameworks. For most ACP countries, the EU is their main trading
partner. Trade between the two regions is thus very important for
ACP countries, because it constitutes, in most cases, their main
revenue source. While the trade arrangement is marginal for the
EU, it is important for the EU MNCs' profitability in a competitive
global market. Even though MNCs have been beneficial to host
States in the ACP, by providing revenue for governments and
creating jobs, their operations have led to various externalities
involving violations of human rights. This paper seeks to explore
the scope of the human rights provisions in EU-ACP agreements
and the instances when these provisions can lead to imposition of
sanctions in cases of human rights violations by MNCs.
II. The European Union and Human Rights
It is widely acknowledged that a core foundational principle of
the European Union is the respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms in its internal and external affairs.' Although
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1. See for example, Chapter 11 of EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS (Paul
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human rights were not expressly mentioned in the founding treaties
of the EU, the concept is rooted in the EU legal order. The EU has
an obligation to respect human rights when acting in its area of
competences. 2 Human rights obligations of the EU were initially
derived from the "general principles" developed by the European
Court of Justice ("ECJ").3 The obligations were also derived from
Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union ("TEU"). The EU has
lately taken steps to strengthen its human rights framework through
the introduction of a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union. The Charter was included in the Treaty of Lisbon,
which has been rejected in Ireland.4
III. The EU and Developing Countries
Since its creation, the European Community/European Union5
has engaged with issues relating to less-developed countries.
6
Several provisions of the EU Treaties provide a basis for extending
the objective of promoting respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms to all forms of cooperation with third
countries, including trade.7 In Article 177 of the Treaty Establishing
Craig & Grainne de Burca eds., Oxford University Press 4th ed. 2007).
2. T. Ahmed & I. de Jesus Butler, The European Union and Human Rights: An
International Law Perspective, 17 (4) EUR. J. INT'L L. 771, 773 (2006).
3. Case 29/69, Stauder v. Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 4119; Case 11/70, Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhrund Vorratsstelle Getreide, 1970 E.C.R. 1125; Case
4/73, Nold v. Commission 1974 E.C.R. 491; Case 36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the
Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 1219; Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz 1979 E.C.R.
3727; Case 5/88, Wachauf v. Germany 1989 E.C.R. 2609; Case C-13/94, P v. S and
Cornwall CC 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143; Case C-36/02, Omega, 2004 ECR 1-9609.
4. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.
5. Note in strict terms, it is the European Community and not the EU that
concludes agreements with third countries because the EU does not currently have
legal personality. The EC is one of the three pillars of the EU and is due to be
completely absorbed by the EU in 2009 if the Treaty of Lisbon comes into force.
Craig and de Burca have however argued that the EU as an entity has acquired
legal personality. See supra note 1, at 167-71.
6. The relationship between the EU and developing countries is more than just
politics. According to Kryvoi, "[tihe European Union absorbs one twenty percent
of developing country exports and forty percent of European Union imports
originate in developing countries." See Yaraslau Kryvoi, Why European Union Trade
Sanctions Do Not Work, 17 MINN. J. INT'L L. 209, 226 (2008).
7. These include: Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1
[hereinafter TEU] arts. 2, 3, 6, 19, 29, 49; Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3 [hereinafter EC Treaty] arts. 11, 13,
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the EC, it is stated that community policy in the sphere of
development co-operation shall foster the sustainable economic and
social development of developing countries, especially the most
disadvantaged. The Article also provided that community policy
shall promote the smooth and gradual integration of developing
countries into the world economy and support the campaign against
poverty. Subsection 2 of Article 177 further states that community
policy in the area of development cooperation shall contribute to a
general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and
the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms. According to an EU policy statement, the article
constitutes the foundation upon which all relations between the EU
and Nigeria is founded.8 The question, however, is how far this
underlying policy affects the EU approach to corporate
responsibility and controls the MNC's activities abroad.
While it is conceded that host States bear the primary
responsibility for controlling MNCs within their jurisdiction, it is
argued that because of limitations in host State control, home States,
such as EU Member States, have important complementary roles to
play in ensuring accountability. The role of the EU is important
because the EU Member States are second only to the U.S. in terms
of popularity as locations for MNC parent companies.9
Furthermore, given that the EU has a highly developed institutional
and legal framework, EU law has greater potential to influence
issues surrounding the accountability of MNCs than international
law or laws of the host jurisdiction. Commenting on the potential of
the EU legal framework for the promotion of human rights, and
economic and social responsibility, Dr. Voiculescu observed that:
At a close analysis, the EU legal framework offers the potential for
a mechanism that, while more unorthodox then [sic] the usual
normative approaches, can lead to an advancement of human
rights and social values within an important group of less
177; Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997,
1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter TA] 6, 7. See also Der-chin Horng, The Human Rights
Clause in the European Union's External Trade and Development Agreements, 9 (5) EUR.
L. J. 677, 677-78 (Dec. 2003).
8. Nigerian-European Community, Country Support Strategy and Indicative
Programme for the Period 2001-2007, http://www.delnga.ec.europa.eu/docs/
CountryStrategy.pdf.
9. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEv. [UNCTD], WORLD INvESTMENT REPORT
at 53-54, U.N. Sales No. E.08.II.D.23 (2008).
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developed countries, the ACP countries. The promotion of
human rights would take place through the grafting of economic
and social responsibility standards on to the agenda of economic
and development co-operation. The question is, of course,
whether the EU offers an established legal and political
mechanism through which such standards and values can become
effective, and whether these mechanisms can be coupled with
instruments of intergovernmental co-operation effective enough
to contribute significantly to the protection and promotion of
human rights.10
IV. Trade and Human Rights
Legal commentators have recognised the viability of employing
trade rules to control MNCs and make them amenable to positive
human rights duties.1 With the prohibition of the use of force to
enforce international law under the United Nations framework,
trade sanctions have emerged as one of the most coercive
mechanisms available to enforce international law, including
international human rights norms.12 Professor Kinley and Tadaki
have suggested that current understandings of international trade,
aid, development finance, and the roles of international institutions
must be re-conceptualised in order to make it possible to view
MNCs as operating within the realm of international law, especially
international human rights law.13 Since corporations, in particular
10. Aurora Voiculescu, Unorthodox Human Rights Instruments: The ACP-EU
Development Co-operation from the Lome Conventions to the Cotonou Agreement, 4 (1) J.
COMMONWEALTH L. & LEGAL EDUC. 85, 86 (April 2006).
11. It must be observed that even though governments do not actively trade,
they make arrangements that facilitate trading activities of MNCs particularly in
the international context which impact on human rights protection. See David
Kinley & Justine Nolan, Trading and Aiding Human Rights: Corporations in the Global
Economy, 25 (4) NORDIC J. HUM. RTs. L. 353, 363 (2007); Christiana Ochoa, Advancing
the Language of Human Rights in a Global Economic Order, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
57, 66-68 (2003). It should be noted that there is no consensus in the academic
literature as to the extent to which there is a linkage between trade and human
rights, however, most commentators agree that there is an interesting connection
between the two which needs to be fully explored. For a review of literature on
trade and human rights see Andrew T. Lang, Re-thinking Trade and Human Rights, 15
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 335, 336 (2007).
12. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Trade Sanctions and Human Rights - Past, Present
and Future, 6 (4) J. INT'L ECON. L. 797, 799-800, 803 (2003).
13. David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human
Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 936
(2003-04); Kinley & Nolan, supra note 11, at 354.
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MNCs, drive free trade, commercial enterprises are the immediate
and direct beneficiaries of trade agreements. Given that is so, Kinley
and Tadaki have posited that the use of trade sanctions may be a
powerful mechanism in controlling the externalities of MNCs.' 4
Trade arrangements may also become significant in regards to
the emerging issue of home State responsibility for extraterritorial
violations of international law by MNCs and their subsidiaries. This
was argued persuasively by Professors McCorquodale and
Simons. 15 The premise of the argument is that governments of
industrialised States explicitly or implicitly assist their corporate
nationals in their global trade and investment ventures. One of the
major ways this is done is by the negotiation and ratification of
bilateral investment agreements that assist extraterritorial
investments by corporate nationals. 16 Based on the international
principle that States have a general duty not to act in ways that
cause harm outside their territory, the writers argue that where a
home State of a MNC negotiates a bilateral investment treaty with a
non-industrialised State, and an MNC working under such
framework violates human rights, the State could be deemed to
have constructive knowledge of such violation and therefore held
accountable for facilitating the extraterritorial harm.1 7  They
therefore argue that the liability of the MNC subsidiary could be
attributed to the home State of the parent company in such
circumstances. According to the writers:
In these circumstances, it is arguable that, although the acts of a
foreign subsidiary of a corporate national cannot be directly
attributed to the home state, the latter exercises sufficient control
over the parent company and has constructive knowledge of the
potential for the subsidiary to violate human rights law to justify
the imposition of an obligation to exercise due diligence in
relation to the human rights impacts of such activity. The
obligation requires a state to take reasonable steps to ensure that
such entities do not operate in violation of international human
rights law even where such operations are conducted through a
foreign subsidiary. This obligation would include, but not limited to,
14. Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 13, at 1006.
15. Robert McCorquodale & Penelope Simons, Responsibility Beyond Borders:
State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human
Rights Law, 70 (4) MOD. L.R. 598 July 2007).
16. Id. at 599-612.
17. Id. at 621.
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requirement that the home state enact domestic regulation, requiring
human rights impact assessments, the subsequent mitigation of any such
impacts, and the provision of a remedy in the home state's courts.18
However, the argument of McCorquodale and Simons is a very
radical position. This writer posits that it would take a long time to
get to the position argued under the current state of international
law. It is arguable that the EU is living up to its international
obligations by arranging trade relations that promote responsible
behaviour by MNCs in developing counties.
V. Can the EU Pursue Human Rights Objectives in Its
Trade Arrangements in View of World Trade
Organisation's Rules?
Generally, States are free to negotiate whatever agreements
they feel best serve their interests. However, a State's ability to
conclude agreements is increasingly being constrained by norms of
global governance such as international trade rules. It has been
observed that because the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
affects State sovereignty, it is fair to say that the body shares in the
balance of power among States.' 9 The three core principles of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 ("GATT"), which
were later incorporated into the WTO agreements of 1944, are the
requirements of "most-favoured-nation treatment" (Article I),
national treatment (Article III), and prohibition of quantitative
restrictions (Article XI). Article I requires Member States not to
discriminate in its trade policies based on grounds of country of
origin or destination. Article III requires treatment no less
favourable of imported products than domestic products.20 Article
XI prohibits placing quota on volume of imports and exports. These
core principles seem to bar the imposition of trade sanctions on
WTO Member States in the pursuit of non-trade issues such as
human rights violations. The pertinent question here is whether in
18. Id. at 623 (emphasis added).
19. Claire Kelly, Power, Linkage and Accommodation: The WTO as an International
Actor and Its Influence on other Actors and Regimes, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 79, 83
(2006).
20. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194,
T.I.A.S. 1700 [hereinafter GATT]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144
[hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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view of international trade rules the EU can use trade agreements to
further human rights issues in third countries. In the context of this
paper, the task is to examine from a legal standpoint the extent to
which Member States of the WTO can legitimately pursue human
rights objectives in their trade relationship without contravening
WTO rules. A related enquiry is whether the ACP-EU arrangement
can incorporate non-trade objectives such as human rights in view
of WTO rules. The position of this paper is that the WTO
arrangement permits Member States to enter into regional
arrangements, which can incorporate non-trade issues such as
human rights. This paper does not engage in a theoretical debate,
but focuses on the implications of the substantive laws in this area.
The WTO has been described as a global governance node: "a
point of intersection of a variety of regulatory networks" 21 that
includes preferential trade and investment agreements and other
trading arrangements. The WTO embodies the "rule of law" in
world trade and its legitimacy derives from the laws establishing
it.22 It is a forum for States to negotiate rules that promote free
trade, transparency, and provide predictability in international
business dealings. Member States are bound by its rules, and the
rules are enforced by an effective dispute resolution mechanism,
from which decisions can lead to the imposition of sanctions against
erring Member States. The Appellate Body of the WTO, which sits
at the apex of the WTO dispute resolution system, has been
described as an international economic court in all but name.
23
However, the WTO trade regime is more than a mere set of rules.
According to Dr. Lang, it is also:
[a] social environment in which ideas about the best and most
appropriate trade policies are generated, legitimated, and
disseminated. It is a cognitive environment in which States are
taught how to interpret the international economic order and how
to calculate their interests in it. It is also an institutional
environment which re-shapes the mix of actors involved in trade
policy-making and the avenues of influence available to them.
24
21. S. Picciotto, The WTO as a Node of Global Governance: Economic Regulation and
Human Rights Discourses, 2007 (1) L., Soc. JUST. & GLOBAL DEv. J. 3.
22. Id. at 4. See also Kelly, supra note 19, at 81.
23. Picciotto, supra note 20, at 5.
24. A.T.F Lang, Re-thinking Trade and Human Rights, 15 (2) TuL. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 335, 412 (2007).
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Among scholars and commentators, the relationship between
the WTO and human rights has generated different positions. It has
been suggested that WTO agreements stifle States' ability to achieve
other objectives, including human rights objectives. 25  In this
connection, it has been argued that the WTO system makes it harder
for States to meet their obligations under the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights to respect, protect and promote human rights. A
usual point of contrast (though arguable) is the fact that the WTO
system has a strong and effective dispute resolution mechanism
while the international system of human rights does not.26 It has
also been argued that WTO rules give precedence to trade over
human rights issues. Others have defended the WTO system,
arguing that the WTO governs trade and not issues such as human
rights.27 Some WTO defenders, however, argue that the WTO
system does in fact promote human rights, albeit indirectly through
the stimulation of trade and improved governance. 28 Eminent
scholars have argued, based on WTO substantive rules and practices
of the organization, that the body is not simply neutral to human
rights issues, but has increasingly incorporated human rights issues
within its framework. 29 Others have argued that the WTO should
promote human rights.30 Petersmann has argued in favour of
25. R. Howse & M. Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy:
Challenges for the World Trade Organization (Montreal: International Centre for
Human Rights and Democratic Development, 2000); F. J. Garcia, The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets: Trading Away the
Human Rights Principle, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 51 (1999); J. Baghwati, The Boundary of
the WTO: Afterword: The Question of Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 126 (2002). Baghwati
argues that WTO's trade regime was established for mutual benefits through trade
and the attempt to link it with non-trade issues such as human rights does not
promote mutual benefits and actually disadvantage countries of the South.
Similarly Jones argues that the WTO is not designed for human rights, and does not
have the capacity or resources to monitor human rights, including worker's rights.
See K. Jones, WHO'S AFRAID OF THE WTO? (Oxford University Press, 2004).
26. S. A. Aaronson, Seeping in Slowly: How Human Rights Concerns are Penetrating
the WTO, 6 (3) WORLD TRADE REV. 413 (2007).
27. T. Eres, The Limits of GATT Article XX: A Back Door for Human Rights, 35 GEO.
J. INT'L L. 597, 602 (2003-04).
28. Kinley & Nolan, supra note 11, at 354.
29. S. J. Powell, The Place of Human Rights Law in World Trade Organization Rules,
16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 219, 221 (2004); Aaronson, supra note 25.
30. P. Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic
Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization, 11 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1996); G. M. Zagel, WVTO and Human Rights: Examining Linkages
and Suggesting Convergence, 2 (2) INT'L DEv.-JuRisT PAPER SERIES 1 (2005).
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strengthening the UN human rights law by integrating it into the
law of the WTO.3
1
A. The WTO System and Human Rights
In its preamble, the Marrakesh Agreement, which established
the WTO, included not only free trade as its objective, but also
human rights and social issues, such as raising the standards of
living, ensuring full employment, sustaining development and
protecting the environment. 32 The original agreement, the GATT
1947, which continues to be applicable, provides in its Articles XX
and XXI a number of grounds upon which Member States may
pursue public welfare issues through trade restrictions
notwithstanding the potential violation of trade rules. It has been
opined that WTO Member States may employ Article XX and XXI as
bases for protecting human rights at home and responding to
human rights abuses abroad.33 Article XXI will be discussed first.
31. E. Petersmann, Time for a United Nations 'Global Compact' for Integrating
Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organisations: Lessons from European
Integration, 13 (3) EUR. I. INT'L L. 621 (2002). E. Petersmann, The Human Rights
Approach Advocated by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the WTO: Is it
Relevant for WTO Law and Policy?, 7 (3) J. INT'L ECON. L. 605 (2004); E. Petersmann,
The WTO Constitution and Human Rights, 3(1) J. INT'L ECON. L. 19 (2002). Alston
critiques Petersmann that his approach will undermine human rights promotion
and protection. See also P. Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human
Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 (4) EUR. J. INT'L L. 815 (2002).
32. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, pmbl [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. Professor Qureshi argues that in a sense,
there is a human rights dimension to the WTO. According to him, this can be
found in trade, trade related and non-trade norms of the WTO and in the manner of
the implementation of these norms. See A.H. Qureshi, International Trade and
Human Rights from the Perspective of the WTO, in F. Weiss, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW WITH A HUMAN FACE 159 (The Hague/Dordrecht/London: Kluwer Law
International, 1998).
33. Aaronson, supra note 26, at 430. Powell argues that Article XX (a) on
protection of public morals opens the possibility for the application of human rights
law. Powell, supra note 29. Lim argues that the WTO system is linked to human
rights aims and outcomes through Article XX. H. Lim, Trade and Human Rights:
What's at Issue?, 35(2) J. WORLD TRADE 275 (2001). Bal also argues that Article XX
can be used to protect human rights. S. Bal, International Free Trade Agreements and
Human Rights: Reinterpreting Article XX of GATT, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 62
(2001). Note however that some scholars argue that Article XX was not meant to
incorporate human right issues. This argument is however losing ground. Eres
argues that the drafters of Article XX did not intend it as a means of incorporating
human rights issues in the WTO system and that Article XX cannot satisfy its
"necessity" test. Eres, supra note 27, at 597. Jarus, writing from women's rights
perspective, contends that the public moral exception under Article XX(a) is a legal
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
1. Article XXI
Article XXI allows Member States to breach their obligation
under GATT for national security reasons. The Article provides:
1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security
interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which
it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from
which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and
implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and
materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose
of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in
pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for
the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article XXI potentially grants wide authority because it allows
Member States to, among other things, take "any action which it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests.., in time of war or other emergency in international
relations."34 The Member States determine what is "necessary,"
what is in their "essential security interests," as well as "time of
war" and "emergency in international relations." 35 Interestingly,
national security under the Article has been tied to the protection of
human rights abroad.36 Goodman argues persuasively that Article
XXI validates the imposition of unilateral economic sanctions by
basis for linking trade and human rights. L. M. Jarvis, Women's Rights and the Public
Moral Exceptions of GATT Article 20, 22 MicH. J. INT'L L. 219 (2000); see also C. T.
Feddersen, Focusing on Substantive Law and International Economic Relations: The
Public Morals of GATT's XX (a) Exception and 'Conventional' Rules of Interpretation, 7
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 75 (1998).
34. GATT, supra note 20, art. XXI(b).
35. P. Lindsay, The Ambiguity of GAIT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant
Failure?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1276, 1277 (2003).
36. Id. at 1298.
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Member States for foreign violations of human rights.37  He
contends that severe human rights violations in foreign countries
may constitute a threat to national security. By "heralding a threat
to harmony among nations," 38 human rights violations may
substantially destabilise proximate States by creating refugee-
related problems, which may constitute as offences against
humanity and a threat to international peace. According to this
argument, which this paper shares, a Member State may justify the
imposition of economic sanctions on another Members State in
violation of GATT/WTO provisions for human rights violations in
the territory of the other Member State on the ground that such
violations constitute a national security threat. As an example, the
EU may justify the imposition of economic sanctions on a third
country either on the ground that human rights violations lead to an
influx of refugee/asylum seekers to Europe or on the ground that
such violations constitute an emergency in international relations.
It has, however, recently been argued by Aaronson that a
Member State may only invoke Article XXI to protect its own
security or the security of its citizens but not the security or citizens
of another State. Member States may apply the exception to other
State(s) when the UN Security Council authorises such trade
restrictions.39 This paper, however, contends that from a literal
reading of the text of the Article, the requirement of UN Security
Council's authorisation is limited to Article XXI(c) but not Article
XXI(b), which has been tied to human right issues. Therefore, where
a Member State derogates from her WTO obligations based on
Article XX(b), UN Security Council authorisation is not required.
The invocation of XXI(c) is limited because of the difficulty in
getting the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council.
However, in the rare case of South Africa, sanctions were
successfully imposed based on Article XXI and United Nations
Security Council authorisation, for gross violations of human rights
in the territory.40
37. R. Goodman, Norms and National Security: The WTO as a Catalyst for Inquiry, 2
CHI. J. INT'L L. 101, 106 (2001).
38. Id. at 106.
39. Aaronson, supra note 26, at 431-32.
40. S.C. Res. 418, U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (Nov. 4, 1977); S.C. Res. 569, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/569 (July 26, 1985).
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2. Article XX
Article XX allows contracting States to adopt or enforce
measures, including those necessary to protect public morals, to
protect human, animal, or plant life or health, to secure compliance
with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with GATT
agreements, to restrict products of prison labour, to preserve
national treasures, and to conserve exhaustible natural resources.
The measures may not, however, be applied in a manner
constituting arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, or a disguised
form of restriction on international trade. Some of the provisions, as
will be discussed presently, have been interpreted to cover human
rights issues. Article XX(a), (b), (d), (e) and (g) may potentially be
construed in human rights terms. It has been argued that
international human rights law is relevant in defining these
exceptions. 41 It must, however, be observed that the WTO Appellate
Body did not use international law in interpreting Article XX(g) in
the Shrimp/Turtle II case.
42
A major significance of the Shrimp/Turtle II case is that it opens
the door for unilateral measures in pursuit of non-trade objectives.
The objective in the case was to protect the environment.
Furthermore, the case impliedly accepted that extraterritorial
measures can fall within Article XX exceptions. In the Shrimp/Turtle
II case, the U.S. took unilateral measures to protect the endangered
species of sea turtles outside its territorial waters. The U.S. imposed
embargoes on the import of shrimp and shrimp products from
countries that failed to certify the shrimps were caught using turtle-
excluder devices. Also excluded were shrimps caught with turtle-
excluder devices that fell below the standard required by the U.S.
The Appellate Body ruled that the action taken by the U.S. fell
within the scope of measures permitted under Article XX.43
As earlier indicated, it is widely contended that Article XX(a),
41. R. Howse and M. Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy:
Challenges for the World Trade Organization (Montreal: International Centre for
Human Rights and Democratic Development, 2000).
42. See Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 133, WT/DS58/AB/R, (Oct. 12, 1998); R. Howse,
Human Rights in the WTO: Whose Rights, What Humanity? Comment on Petersmann, 13
(3) EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 651, 656-657 (2002).
43. However, the Court found that the manner by which the U.S. applied its
measure caused arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination. The U.S. was requested
to bring its measures in line with its WTO obligations.
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on the protection of public morals, "in particular provides a fertile
source of discretion to apply human rights law."44 It has also been
observed that Article XX(a) may in fact go further than human
rights of persons, permitting measures protecting morals of persons
in circumstances not implicating human rights.
45
Professor Charnovit 46 rationalises that the moral exception in
Article XX(a) was introduced because prior to the GATT,
governments were restricting imports or exports for moral or
humanitarian or other non-commercial reasons, and they wanted to
ensure that their obligations under trade treaties would not interfere
with their ability to restrict trade on these grounds.47 He attempts to
interpret the Article following the directive in Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention, which states that a treaty should be interpreted
according to its ordinary meaning and in light of its scope and
objective. He observes that the ordinary meaning of the Article does
not reveal its scope or the extent of its applicability.48 He then
resorts to supplementary means of interpretation as provided under
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. Arguing from historical
antecedents to the GATT, he suggests:
The rationale for the moral exception in trade treaties can be
inferred from the contemporary trade controls that could have
triggered the legal need for an exception. There were trade
controls on opium, pornography, liquor, slaves, firearms,
blasphemous articles, products linked to animal cruelty, prize
fight films, and abortion-inducing drugs .... The various ways
morality-based trade measures had been employed before the
GATT was written foreshadow many of the uses to which article
XX(a) might be enlisted today.49
Charnovitz further suggests that because of the long time usage
of trade measures for moral and humanitarian purposes, the authors
of Article XX(a) might have intended it to have effect both in
external relations of Member States and also in the international
44. See generally note 32 above.
45. Vazquez, supra note 12, at 816 n 70, 818.
46. S. Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 689
(1998).
47. Prior to GATT, there were international treaty regimes and domestic laws
prohibiting trade for moral reasons. For a discussion of some of these, see id. at 710-13.
48. Id. at 716.
49. Id. at 717-18.
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domain. 50 Noting that leaving the determination of what is moral or
immoral to individual governments could disrupt trade and
encourage imperialism by powerful States in the international
market, he suggests Article XX(a) be internationalised. 51 Moreover,
he suggests that the WTO should employ international human
rights law "to ascribe meaning to the vague terms of article XX(a)." 52
However, it must be observed that to date, no Member State has
successfully invoked the provision of Article XX(a) to restrict trade
on the ground of human rights violations.53
Provisions of Article XX have also been analysed in relation to
labour rights. The GATT/WTO has no explicit provision permitting
or requiring the use of trade restrictions against labour rights
violations. However, a combined reading of Article XX(a) and (e)
may provide a legal basis in relation to labour rights. It has been
suggested that Article XX(a) may be employed to justify trade
sanctions "against products that involve the use of child labor or
denial of basic workers' rights."5 4 Article XX(e) expressly permits
such measures in relation to "the products of prison labour." It has
further been suggested that Article XX(a) and (e) and Article XX(b)
on health and safety "could be read expansively so as to include the
core labour standards articulated by the ILO [International Labour
Organisation]."55
The achievement of non-economic objectives such as human
rights is however circumscribed by the "necessity" test under
Article XX(a), (b) and (e), which seemingly ensures that trade issues
are prioritised over other objectives. 56 Article XX (a), (b) and (e)
authorise only measures that are necessary to protect public morals.
50. Interestingly the WTO's Appellate Body decision in the Shrimp/Turtle Case
suggests that Article XX(g) could be applied in a way that impacts on external
relations. The Body interpreted the Article in the light of the principles of
international law. See Shrimp, supra note 42; see also L. Bartels, Article XX of GATT
and the Problem of Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction: The Case of Trade Measures for the
Protection of Human Rights, 36 (2) JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 353 (2002).
51. Charnovitz, supra note 46, at 742.
52. Id.
53. Aaronson, supra note 26, at 431.
54. M. J. Trebilock & R. Howse, Trade Policy & Labour Standards, 14 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 261, 289 (2004-05).
55. E. Alben, GATT and the Fair Wage: A Historical Perspective on the Labour-Trade
Link, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1422 (2001).
56. F.J. Garcia, Building a Just Trade Order for a new Millennium, 33 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 1015, 1055 (2000-01).
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This has been interpreted to mean that non-economic objectives may
be implemented through a measure that will be least trade-
restrictive. 57 This has been the approach taken by the Appellate
Body in the interpretation of the word "necessary" in ArticleXX(b).58
The conclusion to be reached from the discussion so far is that
Article XX and XXI permits Member States to derogate from their
WTO obligations on the ground of human rights violations in other
member countries. Except in the Shrimp/Turtle II case where the
WTO Appellate Body considered Article XX(g), the Appellate Body
has yet to rule directly on the grounds provided for in the two
Articles. However, the majority of academics working in this area
agree with this conclusion.
Some of the later WTO agreements have followed the trend of
including exceptions that allow for the consideration of non-trade
issues. The WTO Agreements on Sanitary Phytosanitary Measures5 9
and the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade60 both
provide that States should not be prevented from taking measures
to protect human life, health or the environment at the level the
concerned State considers necessary and appropriate. 61 Similarly,
the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights62 allows States to provide remedies aimed at
preventing patent rights from having adverse effect on the transfer
of technology vital to medical care and economic development of
less developed countries.
VI. The EU, Trade Agreements, and Human Rights
The European Commission recognised the challenge faced by
the EU in view of its treaty obligations and its investment promotion
strategy in developing countries when it stated that:
The European Union itself has an obligation in the framework of
57. Powell, supra note 29, at 229.
58. Report of the Appellate Body in European Communities - Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos - Containing Products, 170, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12,
2001).
59. WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994.
60. WTO Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994.
61. Powell, supra note 29, at 222.
62. WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994.
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its Co-operation policy to ensure the respect of labour standards,
environmental protection and human rights and is confronted with
the challenge of ensuring a full coherence between its development
policy, its trade policy and its strategy for the development of the private
sector in the developing countries notably through the promotion of
European investment [emphasis added by author]. 63
It is suggested that linking human rights issues to trade
agreements is one of the more effective ways the EU can galvanise
host States into meeting their human rights commitments, including
their responsibility to ensure that private actors such as MNCs do
not violate human rights. The EU already incorporates human
rights clauses into agreements with third countries. 64 A proper
approach to the implementation of human rights clauses is a
practical way of nudging hosts States in the proper direction. The
implication of such a clause is that it incentivises third States to
ensure compliance with international human rights standards to
ensure the continuity of the trade arrangement.
Arguing for the use of trade arrangements to promote
compliance with international obligations and standards in the
context of labour rights, Kryvoi states:
Unilateral sanctions such as withdrawing trade preferences
because of labor rights violations can be considered a cheap way
to promote compliance with international obligations in the sense
that it does not require direct financial spending. Unlike
multilateral sanctions, these sanctions can be implemented
relatively quickly as there is no need to achieve international
consensus. There is usually an aspiration that other countries
would join, and that the unilateral character of sanctions might
change to multilateral. 65
The suggestion being made here is that the inclusion of a clause
that demands the observance of human rights standards already
signed up for by both parties, and that is enforceable by the parties
63. Commission Green Pal3er on Promoting a European Framework for Corporate
Social Responsibility, at 13, COM (2001) 366 Final, July 18, 2001) (emphasis added).
64. There are arguments against this practice which we shall return to later. As
of 2005 there were about 150 of such agreements containing human rights between
the EU and third countries. See L. Bartels, HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONALITY IN THE
EU's INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 2 (Oxford University Press 2005).
65. Kryvoi, supra note 6, at 223; see also E. M. Hafner-Burton, Trade Human
Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression, 59 INT'L
ORG. 593, 593-629 (2005).
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under the agreement, will enable the EU to demand that countries
comply with their human rights obligations in their territory,
including the assurance that private actors not violate human rights.
The EU has concluded, and is in the process of concluding, a wide
range of complex preferential and non-preferential trading
arrangements with third countries and regional organisations. 66 The
EU has insisted that all trade, cooperation, dialogue, partnership
and association agreements with third parties contain a human
rights clause.67 It is important to reiterate that WTO agreements, to
which the EU Member States are parties, do not prevent them from
incorporating international human rights principles in their own
activities. Thus, incorporating human rights clauses into EU trade
arrangements will not infringe the obligations of Member States
under WTO agreements. 68
A. The Significance of Human Rights Clauses
Under Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties ("VCLT"),69 a treaty can be terminated or suspended if it is
so provided in the treaty, and in case of a "material breach" of the
treaty. A material breach is defined to include either (a) "a
repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present
Convention," 70 or (b) "the violation of a provision essential to the
accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty." 71 However,
in the absence of such provisions, there is no entitlement under the
VCLT to terminate or suspend treaties simply on the basis of human
rights violations. Therefore, a State would be entitled to terminate a
treaty on the ground of human rights violations if there is a human
rights clause in the agreement and the clause is made an "essential
66. As earlier noted, in strict terms, it is the European Community and not the
EU that concludes agreements with third parties because the EU does not currently
have legal personality. The EC is one of the three pillars of the EU and is due to be
completely absorbed by the EU in 2009 if the Treaty of Lisbon comes into force. See
also V. Miller, The Human Rights Clause in the EU's External Agreements 9, House of
Commons Library, Research Paper 04133, Apr. 16, 2004, available at
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2004/rpO4-033.pdf.
67. Id. at 9. Human right clauses are applicable in EU's treaty with around 150
countries. See Bartels, supra note 64, at 2.
68. Horng, supra note 7, at 677-97; Bartels, supra note 64, at 70.
69. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT].
70. Id. art. 60(3)(a).
71. Id. art. 60(3)(b).
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element" of the agreement.
B. Human Rights Clauses as a Strategy in EU External Relations
Bartels highlights the possible reasons why the EU is taking a
more active approach to human rights issues through the use of
human rights clauses in trade agreements. 72 One is the possibility of
the annulment of a similar scheme under the Generalised System of
Preferences ("GSP") Programme. 73 As will be explained later in this
paper, the GSP granted trade preferences to developing countries
and provisions in the scheme conditioned the enjoyment of
incentives under the programme on the observance of certain
international standards. 74 An arrangement under the GSP was
challenged by India at the WTO in 2004.75 The WTO Appellate Body
held that the programme of incentives for countries combating drug
and trafficking was a violation of the WTO Enabling Clause because
it discriminated among developing countries. 76 The EU has since
replaced this particular arrangement with the 'GSP+' arrangement. 77
Doubts have been expressed as to the compatibility of the new
arrangement with WTO rules. 78 Thus, a cloud of uncertainty still
hovers over the GSP arrangement. 79 A second possible rationale for
the EU's pro-human rights approach may be that human rights
clauses can also be used as social clauses, 80 allowing the EU to
discriminate against goods that are produced in a manner that
violates international labour standards. 81 Furthermore, the EU has
72. Bartels, supra note 64, at 40-44.
73. Id. at 41.
74. Id.
75. See Appellate Body Report, EC-Tariff Preferences, WT/DS246/AB/R
(adopted April 2004).
76. See Bartels, supra note 64, at 41.
77. Council Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 of 27 June 2005, 2005 O.J. (L 169).
78. L. Bartels, The WTO Legality of the EU's GSP + Arrangement, 10 (4) J. INT'L
ECON. L. 869, 869-86 (2007).
79. Kryvoi, supra note 6, at 225.
80. A social clause is a provision in international bilateral and multilateral trade
treaties that links labour standards to liberalisation of international trade. Trading
access to markets of developed countries is conditional upon compliance with
international labour standards. Failure to comply results in trade sanctions and
loss of market access. See R. N. Sanyal, The Social Clause in Trade Treaties: Implication
for International Firms, 29 J. Bus. ETHIcs 379, 380 (2001).
81. According to Dr. Bartels, even though the EU officially opposed the use of
trade sanctions in the field of labour, its incorporation of the social clause in the
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realised that human rights clauses can be used to exert positive
measure on third countries to protect human rights. This supports
and encourages initiatives in the territory of the third country by
using trade arrangements as incentives. According to Bartels,
human right clauses "set higher than normal standards, they permit
counter-measures which would not be available under customary
international law, and they impose positive obligations on the treaty
parties to ensure respect for human rights through their respective
territories."8 2
C. EU Competence to include Human Rights Clauses in
International Agreements
The ECJ's decision in Opinion 2/94 that "[no Treaty provision
confers on the Community institutions any general power to enact
rules on human rights or to conclude international conventions in
this field" 83 seems to suggest that the EU has no competence to
include human rights clauses in its international agreements,
including trade agreements. However, commentators have
disagreed with this reasoning, arguing that the Community has
competence. It is argued that the Community has no need for a
separate legal basis to include such clauses as the clauses establish
steps in taking measures to implement existing human rights
standards. It is further argued that there are express powers under
EC Treaties that permit the inclusion of such clauses.84 The position
that there was no need for a separate legal basis for the clauses
appears to be the position of the Council. 85
The ECJ had the opportunity to consider the legality of such a
clause in an EC Cooperation Agreement with India in Portuguese
Republic v. The Council of the European Union.86 In that case, the
Government of Portugal had requested the Court to annul Council
GSP and the Commission's explicit support for social clauses show that the EU may
change its position especially if the GSP arrangement is nullified by the WTO.
Bartels, supra note 64.
82. Id. at 238.
83. Opinion 2/94, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759.
84. Bartels, supra note 64, at 169-70; B. Brandtner & A. Rosas, Human Rights and
the External Relations of the European Community: An Analysis of Doctrine and Practice,
9 EuR. J. INT'L L. 468, 474-75 (1998).
85. Bartels, supra note 64, at 170.
86. Case C-268/94, The Portuguese Republic v. Council of the European Union,
1996 E.C.J. Reports 1-6177.
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Decision 94/578/EC of 18 July 1994 on the conclusion of an EC
Cooperation Agreement with India.87 Portugal challenged the
validity of the human rights clause and the EC's implied
competence to introduce such a clause into its external agreements. 88
Portugal contended that recourse should have been had to Article
235 TEC (now 308EC), which requires a unanimous decision of
Member States.89 It was further argued by Portugal that the
"fundamental rights" referred to in the preamble to the Single
European Act ("SEA") and the references to the TEU were defining
only general objectives and did not give rise to any specific
community powers.90 It was further contended that Article 130u (2)
TEC (now Article 177(2)EC) made human rights a general objective
of community policy. Therefore, agreements based on 13 0y (now
181EC) can only make general references to human rights.91 As
such, human rights cannot be made an "essential element" of the
agreement as it would go beyond the remit of objective of Article
130u (2) (177(2) EC) in the treaty.
The ECJ dismissed the application, holding in favour of the
Commission's argument that the inclusion of the clause was valid
by virtue of Articles 130u (177(2) EC) and 130y (181 EC).92 The
Articles permitted the Community to "conclude agreements in the
area of development cooperation with the object of promoting
human rights and democracy." 93 Thus, the ECJ conferred legal
validity on the practice of inserting human rights clauses in
agreements with third countries. However, the human rights clause
considered here was one without a non-execution clause, which, Dr.
Bartels argued, is different from one with a non-execution clause.94
Bartels has challenged the assumption that no legal basis is
required for the inclusion of such clauses, contending that this







93. Id. Bartels, supra note 64, at 170.
94. A non-execution clause imposes positive obligations on the parties to fulfil
whatever obligations are set out in the essential element clause and allow for
measures to be taken against a defaulting party.
95. See, e.g., Bartels, supra note 64, at 172-206.
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number of reasons. One, human rights clauses do not merely restate
standards under customary international law.96 According to him,
when an essential clause refers to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, it goes beyond customary international law because
not all provisions of the declaration can be regarded as such.
97
Second, both parties to the agreement have significantly enhanced
rights to enforce the norms and also corollary secondary obligations
to suffer the consequences of a failure to comply.98 He contends that
if the Community has a positive obligation in this respect, it would
require legislative competence to adopt appropriate measures. 99
Third, the position ignores the fact that human rights clauses imply
a delegation of power to institutions created by the agreements.100
The decisions of such bodies can be considered to be part of the
Community legal order, which could have direct effect requiring the
justification for the grant of such power under EU treaties. 01 He
further argues that human rights clauses have the implication of
imposing positive obligations on the Community, which may
potentially require the enactment of legislation.10 2 He also argues
that it is a fundamental rule that the Community needs to establish a
legal basis for every action it takes.103 The legal basis must be
ascertained having regard to the aim and content of the measure at
issue. 04
Bartels contends that human rights clauses perform three
important functions, all of which must find legal basis in EU
treaties. 05 First, they operate as a "sword," giving the Community
the legal right to compel third countries to comply with human
rights norms.106 The wrongful act of the third State is thus the focal
point of the clause in this regard. As Bartels, correctly pointed out,









104. Id. Craig and De Burca have, however, argued that the EU as an entity has
acquired legal personality. See Craig & de Burca, supra note 1, at 171.
105. Bartels, supra note 64, at 175-76.
106. Id.
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v France that: "a provision such as Article 1(1) of the Agreement may
be... an important factor for the exercise of the right to have a
development cooperation agreement suspended or terminated
where the non-member country has violated human rights." 107
Second, human rights clauses operate as a "shield," enabling
the Community to revoke an agreement if it contributes to
violations of human rights norms in a third country.108 This is in
keeping with the Community's international obligations to protect
human rights and its duty to respect fundamental rights in all of its
activities under Community law.109 Third, human rights clauses
through their contents impose positive obligations on the
Community to ensure respect for human rights.110
Bartels also analysed in detail the express powers as provided
under EU treaties to ascertain whether the clauses are justifiable by
their provisions."' He also considered whether the clauses can be
justified as implied powers or under the doctrine of "ancillary
clauses."11 2 He concluded:
[T]here are express legal bases (Articles 179/181, 181a, 13, 301,
and 310 EC) that can support the inclusion of human rights
clauses both as a "sword" and as a "shield", though these are each
subject to particular limitations. There is also an implied
functional power on which human rights clauses can more
generally be justified on the basis that they serve as a "shield." 113
Bartels reached this conclusion in light of the distribution of
competences between the Community and Member States. That
exercise, however, is not relevant to this discussion. The important
point for the purpose of this paper is that he agreed that there is a
legal basis for the inclusion of the clauses in EU trade arrangements
even though he reached this conclusion in a manner different from
most commentators on the subject.
107. Case 268/94, Portugal v France, 1996 E.C.R. 1-6177, 27.
108. Id.
109. Bartels, supra note 64, at 175-76.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 177-212.
112. Id. at 213-24.
113. Id. at 225.
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VII. The Legal Status of Human Rights Clauses in
ACP-EU Agreements under International Law
Less developed countries played a limited role in the early
development of the GATT and thus had little influence in the
formulation of its policies in the early days of the framework. This
led many less-developed countries to be critical of the arrangements
and suspicious of its consequences for them. In order to allay the
fears of the less-developed countries, the GATT contracting States
adopted Part IV of GATT to address issues raised by less developed
States. Part IV recognises that market access to products of export
interest to less-developed countries needs to be improved. Part IV
also includes a general clause on recommendations to developing
States on how to promote issues of interest to less-developed States.
Institutional arrangements to implement Part IV provisions were
also suggested. 114  However, Part IV has no legal obligation
attached, which made it ineffective in addressing the concerns of the
less developed countries. In 1971, two waivers were adopted
allowing for two types of preferences favouring less-developed
countries." 5 These include the permission of a "generalised system
of preferences" and permission for less-developed countries to
exchange tariff preferences among themselves." 6 An "Enabling
Clause" introduced in 1979 made the waivers permanent.1 7 The
Enabling Clause established the policy of special and preferential
treatment for less developed countries." 8 The arrangement allows
WTO members to favour certain less developed countries without
violating GATT's MFN requirements." 9
114. See M. Matsushita, T. J. Schoenbaum & P. C. Mavroidis, THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACrICE, AND POLICY 223-25 (Oxford University Press 2d ed.
2006); Vazquez, supra note 12, at 819.
115. See Decision by the Contracting parties of June 25, 1971, concerning the
establishment of a "system of generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory
preferences beneficial to developing countries." (BISD 18s/26).
116. Id.
117. Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries (Nov. 28, 1979) GATT B.I.S.D (26th Supp.) at
203 (1980).
118. Matsushita et al., supra note 114, at 768.
119. The WTO Appellate Body stated in its Report on EC-Tariff Preferences that
the Enabling Clause constitutes an exception to Article I of GAIT and takes
precedence where there is a conflict between the two provisions. See European
Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries,
WT/DS 246/R (Dec. 1 2003) & WT/DS256/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004).
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It is pertinent to note that historically the EC/EU has been at
the forefront of the call for the establishment of Preferential Trade
Arrangements ("PTAs"). According to Matsushita and others, there
are two main reasons for this:
(a) some of the partners were candidates for accession (and a
preferential scheme was thought to be the antechamber to the
European Community), or ex-colonies of the European
Community members, with which, it was felt some form of
preferential trade should be established;
(b) trade policy was the only "genuine" common policy of the
European Community in the realm of international relations:
signing trade agreements with various partners carried an
inherent positive externality, in that it affirmed the European
persona as one entity in the eyes of the world. 120
The EC/EU thus employed the GSP in its dealings with the
ACP, which were later supplemented by the Cotonou Agreement. 121
The Cotonou Agreement introduced the concept of Economic
Partnership Agreement, a scheme designed to redefine the
relationship between the ACP and the EU.122
The term "Economic Partnership Agreements" ("EPAs") is not
commonly used in international trade. However, the arrangement
is synonymous with the concept of "free-trade area" ("FTA") under
the WTO architecture. This point is buttressed by Articles 34(4),
36(1), and 37(7) of the Cotonou Agreement, requiring the
establishment of WTO compatible trading arrangements. 123 The
EPAs between the EU and the ACP countries are required in
particular to be compatible with Article XXIV of GATT, which
allows for the establishment of FTAs and Custom Unions.124 FTAs
are essentially preferential schemes that deviate from the obligation
not to discriminate.
Article XXIV(4) of GATT specifically allows for the use of
Preferential Trade Arrangements ("PTAs") in FTAs and Custom
120. Matsushita et al., supra note 114, at 550.
121. Id. at 774.
122. Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its
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Unions.1 25 The Article provides:
The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing
freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary
agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the
countries parties to such agreements. They also recognize that the
purpose of a customs union or a free-trade area should be to
facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise
barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such
territories.
However, there are conditions that must be satisfied by the
arrangement under Article XXIV. The three requirements under the
Article can be summarised as follows:
1. The obligation to notify the WTO's Committee on Regional
Trade Arrangements of the scheme;
2. The obligation to liberalise among participating countries
substantially all trade; and
3. The obligation not to raise overall level of protection and not
to make access by countries not participating in the PTA
more difficult.126
Article XXIV(8), which states that all trade and tariff restrictions
in FTAs must be liberalised, expressly exempted measures under
certain Articles, including Articles XX, from the obligation.
127
Consequently, such measures can be maintained.1 28
In conclusion, as long as the conditions specified under Article
XXIV are met, Member States are free to establish FTAs among
themselves. The WTO does not dictate the contents of the
agreements outside the conditions specified. The WTO therefore
does not preclude the inclusion of human rights issues in these
agreements. The point being made in this section is that Article XX
and XXI permits Member States to derogate from their obligations
under WTO rules on human rights grounds. Moreover, FTAs, such
as the one envisaged under the EPAs, are permitted under WTO
rules and can incorporate human rights issues. Consequently, the
incorporation of human rights and social clauses in the EPAs are
legitimate.
125. GATT, supra note 20.
126. Matsushita, supra note 114, at 555.
127. Id.
128. WTO AND EAST ASIA: NEw PERSPECrIVES 497, 508 (M. Matsushita & D. Ahn
eds., Cameron May Ltd., 2004).
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VIII. ACP and EU Agreements
The Georgetown Agreement is the partnership agreement
between the ACP and the EU. It is officially called the "ACP-EC
Partnership Agreement" and commonly known as the "Cotonou
Agreement." 129 The ACP was originally created with the aim of
coordinating cooperation between its members and the EU in the
negotiation and implementation of cooperation agreements. The
activities of the group were widened with the growth of
globalisation and trade liberalisation. Since its creation, cooperation
between the EU and the group has taken place within the
framework of four successive Lome Conventions 130 (Lome I-IV) in
place since 1975 and the Cotonou Agreement. The Cotonou
Agreement, which was signed in 2000 (and revised in 2005), is the
latest agreement between the EU and the ACP. Under the Cotonou
Agreement, new objectives for the relationship between the parties
were set out, including the eradication of poverty, which is
consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and
gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy.131
The achievements of these goals are based on five interdependent
pillars with the following objectives: fighting against poverty,
increased participation, a more strategic approach to cooperation,
new economic and trade partnerships, and improved financial
cooperation. 132
It may be instructive to note the main difference between the
Lome Agreements and the Cotonou Agreement. The Lome
Agreements established a privileged trade relationship between
ACP and the European Community by providing non-reciprocal
trade preferences. 133 The preferences allow ACP products to benefit
129. Partnership Agreement between the members of the African Caribbean and
Pacific group of states of the one part, and the European community and its
Member States, of the other part, available at http://ec.europa.eu/development/
ICenter/Pdf/agr0len.pdf; Voiculescu, supra note 10, at 85-86, 92; J. Nwobike, The
Application of Human Rights in African Caribbean and Pacific-European Union
Development and Trade Partnership, 6 (10) GERMAN L. J. 1381 (2006).
130. Voiculescu, supra note 10, at 89-92.
131. Article 1, Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African,
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European
Community and its Member states of the other part, signed in Cotonou on June 23,
2000 (The Cotonou Agreement).
132. Id.
133. Voiculescu, supra note 10.
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from more advantageous customs duties than products from other
regions entering the European Community. 34 However, ACP
countries were not committed to giving the same advantages to
European products. 35 The rationale for the non-reciprocity was
based on the difference in economic development between the EC
and the ACP countries and the objective of Article 177 EC.136
The Cotonou Agreement was signed to modify EU-ACP trade
relations for three main reasons: the incompatibility of Lome IV
with WTO rules,137 the insufficiency and inefficiency of Lome IV to
integrate ACP into current international trade regimes, and the wish
of Europe to redefine the organisation of its trade relations with
third countries. 138 The current trade regime under the Cotonou
agreement is based on a waiver to the WTO principles obtained in
2001.139 The waiver was granted to allow the partnership transit
from the Lome system to new international trade rules. The waiver
expired on December 31, 2007, and negotiations are in progress to
establish new EPAs. 140
Dr. Storey succinctly described the shift in EU policy towards
the ACP as follows:
This shift is explained on two grounds. First, non-reciprocal
arrangements are judged to be in breach of WTO rules (whereas
reciprocal free-trade deals are not), and a WTO waiver allowing
temporary retention of the Lom&style provisions expires at the
end of 2007. Second, there is a claimed "mutual recognition that
existing non reciprocal trade preferences have not promoted the




137. The preferential EU tariffs on ACP exports and the discrimination among
ACP developing countries and non-ACP developing countries are deemed
incompatible with the arrangement under the WTO rules.
138. A. Storey, Normative Power Europe? Economic Partnership Agreements and
Africa, 24 (3) J. CoNTEMp. AFR. STUD. 331 (2006).
139. The waiver includes: Most-favoured-nation (MFN) status - treating other
nations equally; Reciprocity - Every country has to grant equivalent trade
advantages to those given by its trading partner; National treatment - Treating
foreigners and locals equally. Imported and locally produced goods should be
treated equally at least after the foreign goods have entered the market.
140. C.M.O. Ochieng, The EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements and the
'Development Question'. Constraints and Opportunities posed by Article XXIV and
Special and Differential Treatment Provisions of the WVTO, 10 (2) J. INT'L ECON. L. 365,
367 (2007).
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ACP countries." ... There is evidence for this latter claim: the
ACP share of world exports fell from 3.2 per cent in 1970 to 1.3 per
cent in 2003, while even the ACP share of the EU market (where
they enjoyed favourable access) declined over the same period
from 4.1 to 1.0 per cent .... However, whether EPAs are the best
means to reverse this trend towards marginalisation is not as
widely agreed upon.
141
A major consequence of the Cotonou agreement is that the non-
reciprocal trade preferences under Lome IV will be replaced by new
schemes (the EPAs) originally scheduled to commence in 2008.142 To
date, only one out of six proposed new agreements has been
concluded. Negotiations on the rest are ongoing. The arrangement
will provide for reciprocal trade agreements whereby ACP countries
will also provide duty-free access to their markets for EU exports.
1 43
However, countries in the ACP designated as least developed
countries ("LDCs") may be able to either continue with the
arrangements under Lome IV or the "Everything But Arms"
regulation.4 4 Furthermore, other ACP countries who decide that
they are not in a position to enter into the new regime under EPAs
may enter into other available cooperation mechanisms such as the
EU's Generalised System of Preferences ("GSP"), subject to
compatibility with WTO rules.
45
141. Storey, supra note 138, at 335.
142. The Cotonou Agreement.
143. Id.
144. The Everything But Arms ("EBA") is an initiative of the EU under which all
imports to the EU from designated LDCs (less developed countries) are duty free
and quota free with the exception of armaments. The initiative is part of the EU
Generalised System of Preferences ("GSP") which will be elaborated upon later in
this paper. It should be observed that GSP is currently one of the few methods
available for going beyond state sovereignty to ensure compliance with
international labour standards. See Kryvoi, supra note 6, at 209.
145. It should be noted that a GSP arrangement is not negotiated. The EU
designs it and offers it on its own terms. The EU could amend or suspend it
whenever it deems fit. There are doubts whether the GSP and the EBA are actually
alternatives to the EPAs, as they can be rescinded at any time by the EU. See House
of Commons, International Development Committee, Fair Trade? The European
Union's Trade Agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries, Sixth Report of
Session 2004-05, Mar. 23, 2005.
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A. Lome IV: Human Rights Clauses and "Essential Elements"
In its agreements with the ACP, the EU first introduced general
references to human rights in the preamble of Lome 111.146 The
subsequent 1989 Lome IV Convention included a specific human
rights element in Article 5(2) but the human rights element was not
included as an "essential element." 147 Thus, human rights standards
could not be used under Lome IV as a justification for terminating
or suspending the trade arrangement. However, in the 1990s, the
agreement between the EU and third countries started incorporating
human rights clauses as important elements of the agreement, but
not in the terms of "essential elements" under the VCLT.148 In
November 1991, the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution
recognising human rights as an aim of community development
policy, which included provisions for sanctions against violating
States as a last resort.149 Thereafter, EU agreements with third
countries started featuring human rights clauses as an essential
clause of the agreements.
50
In response to the Commission's communication for the
inclusion of respect of democratic principles and human rights in
agreements between the Community and third parties, the Council
of Ministers in 1995 decided to include suspension mechanisms in
all Community agreements with third parties, which would enable
the Community to react immediately in the event of violations of
human rights or any other essential aspects of the agreements.'51
146. Lome III Convention, 1980 OJ L86/3.
147. Lome IV Convention, 1989.
148. See e.g., The Framework Treaty signed with Argentina, April 1990 O.J.L.
295/90, Oct. 26, 1990, p. 0067-0073; Chile 1990, O.J.L. 79/91, Mar. 26, 1991 p. 0002-
0011; Uruguay 1992, O.J.L. 94/92, Apr. 8, 1992, p. 0002-0011; Paraguay 1992, O.J.L.
313/92, Oct. 30, 1992 p. 0072-0081. See also Horng, supra note 7, at 678.
149. See Doc. No. 10107/9; see EU Annual Report on Human Rights, Oct. 10 2003,
COHOM 29.
150. See, e.g., Agreement between the European Economic Community and the
Republic of Albania, On Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation, O.J.L.
343. Article 1 of the Agreement provides that "[r]espect for democratic principles
and human rights established by the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for
a new Europe inspires the domestic and external policies of the Community and
Albania and constitutes an essential element of the present agreement." See also
Bulgaria's Europe Agreement, signed on Mar. 8, 1993, entry into force Feb. 1, 1995,
1994 O.J. (L 358/3); Romania, 1994 O.J. (L 357/2). See also L. Bartels, The Trade and
Development Policy of the European Union, 18(4) EUR. J. INT'L L. 715, 738 (2007).
151. See Commission Communication on the Inclusion of Respect for Democratic
Principles and Human Rights in Agreements Between the Community and Third
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The suspension clauses are referred to in the literature as "non-
execution clauses."152 In the communication leading up to the
decision, the Commission recommended model clauses to be
included in all Community agreements.153 It was stated that the
preamble should contain "general references to human rights and
democratic values" and "references to universal and regional
instruments common to both parties." 5 4 The agreement should also
contain an Article X, which shall define essential elements of the
agreement as follows:
Respect for the democratic principles and fundamental human
rights established by [the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights/the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New
Europe] inspires the domestic and external policies of the
Community and of [the country or group of countries concerned]
and constitutes an essential element of this agreement.155
The Commission further stated that the agreement should
include an Article Y on non-execution, which entitles parties to take
appropriate measures in the event of breach of Article X, in respect
of the principle of proportionality between the breach and the
reaction. 56 The draft clause further provides that before either party
takes measures against a breach, it shall supply the relevant body
under the agreement with any information required for a thorough
examination of the situation with a view to seeking a solution
acceptable to the parties.157 However, this shall not be applicable in
cases of special urgency15 8 The Commission also required that an
interpretative declaration be included in the agreement to clarify
"cases of urgency" under Article Y and "material breach" under
Article X. 159
The Community subsequently revised the human rights clause
Countries, COM (95) 216 (May 23, 1995); Commission Communication on the European
Union and External Dimension of Human Rights Policy: From Rome to Maastricht and
Beyond, Corn (95) 567 (Dec. 17, 1998).
152. Bartels, supra note 64.
153. Communication on the Inclusion of Respect for Democratic Principles and Human
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in Lome IV in 1995 to make the clause an essential element of the
agreement.160 The revision also permits the suspension of the
Convention, including trade rights, in the event of contravention of
the essential element clause.'61 Article 5 of the Convention provides
inter alia:
Respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of
law, which underpins relations between the ACP States and the
Community and all provisions of the Convention, and governs
the domestic and international policies of the Contracting Parties,
shall constitute an essential element of this convention.
Article 366a (2) of the Convention states:
If one Party considers that another Party has failed to fulfil an
obligation in respect of one of the essential elements referred to in
Article 5, it shall invite the Party concerned, unless there is special
urgency, to hold consultations with a view to assessing the
situation in detail and, if necessary, remedying it.
The Cotonou Agreement in 2000 introduced a new version of
the "essential element" clause and this version became the standard
model for subsequent agreements with third countries. The EU's
2003 Annual Human Rights Report described the clause in the
Cotonou agreement as a "'state of the art' version of the essential
element clause."162 The clause is very extensive and contains an
elaborate procedure for implementation. Article 9 of the Cotonou
Agreement titled "Essential Elements and Fundamental Element"
provides inter alia:
The Parties undertake to promote and protect all fundamental
freedoms and human rights, be they civil and political, or
economic, social and cultural .... Respect for human rights,
democratic principles and the rule of law, which underpin the
ACP-EU Partnership, shall underpin the domestic and
international policies of the Parties and constitute the essential
elements of this Agreement.163
The agreement contains a non-execution clause in Article 96.164
160. Lome IV, introduced in the Agreement Amending the Fourth ACP-EC
Convention of Lome IV signed in Mauritius on Nov. 4, 1995, 1998 O.J. (L 156/3).
161. See id. art. 5(1)-(3) & art. 336a; see also L. Bartels, The Trade and Development
Policy of the European Union, 18(4) EuRO. J. INT'L. L. 715, 738 (2007).
162. EUROPEAN UNION, ANNUAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2003).
163. Supra note 122, art. 9.
164. Id.
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A system of sanctions is provided for failure of a State party to fulfill
an obligation stemming from respect for human rights, democratic
principles, and the rule of law. 65  In such circumstances,
consultations are to be held and if the consultations do not yield an
acceptable solution, or if consultations are refused, or where there is
special urgency, appropriate measures may be taken in accordance
with international law and proportionate to the violation.166
A slight amendment was made to the provisions in 2005
placing emphasis on political dialogue before the imposition of
sanctions in case of contravention of the essential element clause. 67
B. The Desirability of Human Right Clauses in EU-ACP Agreements
Both within and outside academic circles, there are divergent
views as to the use of human rights clauses in trade agreements.
Some argue that human rights clauses do not go far enough and
some think they go too far. For some commentators, human rights
conditionality is legally unacceptable and morally unjustifiable.
Some argue that it goes outside the competence of the EC while
others question its effectiveness. 168 Third world countries have
viewed the clauses as an intrusion on national sovereignty. There
have been objections to the clauses from ACP countries. The
introduction of human rights clauses in the Lome Convention was
regarded as an attack on national sovereignty and hypocritical on
the part of the EU. Furthermore, the clauses were considered to take
a narrow interpretation of human rights as only civil and political
rights, ignoring economic, social and cultural rights. 69
It is however contended that these arguments are overstated.
Clearly, there is a legal basis for the inclusion of these clauses (as has
been shown in this paper). Furthermore, the clauses do not create
new norms but only seek to enforce existing norms that have been
ratified by the parties to the agreements. In fact, the EU could not
165. Id. at S 96(2). Id. art. 96(2).
166. Supra note 122, art. 96(2)(a). Since the signing of the Cotonou Agreement,
its provisions have been invoked to impose sanctions on Haiti, Zimbabwe, and
Republic of Guinea. J. Nwobike, The Application of Human Rights in African
Caribbean and Pacific-European Union Development and Trade Partnership, 6(10)
GERMAN L. J. 1382, 1391-92 (2005).
167. Agreement amending the Cotonou Agreement, 2005, OJ L209/27, amending
Articles 8, 9, and 96 and introducing a new Annex VII.
168. Miller, supra note 66, at 30.
169. Id. at 40.
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act otherwise as it is obligated under its laws to adhere to the
principles both in its domestic and external relations. What would
thus be hypocritical is for it to maintain a domestic system that
respects human rights within Europe without doing the same in its
external relations. The argument that the clauses are intrusions into
national sovereignty are equally misconceived as it ignores the fact
that the clauses give similar rights to all parties under the
agreement. It is not suggested here that there is equality of
partnership between the EU and the ACP. The House of Commons
in England succinctly describes the scenario when considering the
ongoing negotiations of EPAs between the two blocs as follows:
The relationship between the EU and the ACP has never been an
equal one. This has not changed in the negotiations for the
Economic Partnership Agreements. There appears to be an
assumption within the UK Government and the European
Commission that the ACP can sign up to, or reject, whatever they
wish. This is not the case. The ACP States remain recipients of
EU aid, some of which funds ACP negotiating capacity. The ACP
nevertheless lacks the negotiating capacity of the EU and is
stretched to negotiate simultaneously in the WTO and other
regional negotiations. The ACP is also economically weak
compared to the EU: it has very little to offer the EU and
potentially much to gain from the negotiations. The collective
ACP stake in the partnership negotiations is therefore significant.
The negotiating process should be undertaken with this disparity
in power in mind.170
This situation thus puts responsibility on the EU to negotiate an
agreement consistent with its standards and its obligations under
international law.
IX. The Application of the Human Right Clauses and
Multinational Corporations
Despite the lofty ideals espoused in the human rights clauses,
their invocation in actual practice in EU external relations has been
very modest.171 The interesting point, however, is that these clauses
have the potential of being invoked in many areas. Some of the
170. HousE OF COMMONS, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE, Fair Trade?
The European Union's Trade Agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries,
Sixth Report of Session 2004-2005 6, 6.
171. Bartels, supra note 64, at 37.
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areas in which EU institutions have made reference to the
applicability of the clauses include violations of minority rights,
women's rights, the right to travel, freedom of speech and political
activities, child sex tourism, women trafficking, violations of
impunity from prosecution for human rights violations, treatment of
detainees and dissidents and core labour standards. 172  Their
application has been more rigorous under Lome IV and the Cotonou
Agreements. However, under the later agreements, the targets have
generally been the poorest ACP countries and it has been applied
mostly in cases of unlawful change of government.173 In most cases,
the measures taken have been the suspension of financial and other
cooperation but not trade benefits174
The invocation of the human rights clauses in these limited
circumstances is a drawback of the practice. There is a need for a
comprehensive approach to accommodate other human rights
violations such as the violation of human rights by MNCs. Where
there is clear evidence that MNCs are violating human rights and
the State concerned is not taking steps to remedy the situation, the
non-execution clause should be triggered in order to check the
situation. For example, in 1995, Shell was implicated in the supply
172. Id. at 36.
173. Some examples of the invocation of the clauses under the agreement
between the EU and ACP: In 1999, following a coup d'etat in Niger, the EU held
consultations with the Niger Government and the ACP states under Article 366a of
Lome IV. The same procedure was used when there was violence outbreak in
Guinea-Bissau, May 1999; Togo in 1998 and Comoros, following a coup d'etat in
1999 (See EU Annual Report on Human Rights 1998/1999). The EU has also used
the unilateral suspension of benefits under Lome IV for failure to move towards
democracy or observe human rights. The case of Haiti is an example. After a
general election in 2000, which was marred with various irregularities and fraud,
the EU invited the Haiti Government to enter into consultations under Article 96 of
the Cotonou Agreement. Haiti did not respond and the EU adopted a decision on
January 29, 2001, under Article 96(2) to take proportionate measures against Haiti
which included suspending direct budgetary aid and withholding future aid from
the European Development Fund. The measures were renewed in 2001, 2002 and
2003. See Miller, supra note 66, at 29. The human rights clause was used in a
comprehensive way in the case of human rights violations in Zimbabwe. In March
2001, the EU called for political dialogue under Article 8 of Cotonou Agreement
and because there was no meaningful progress from the talk, in July 2001, the
Commission invoked Article 96 against Zimbabwe and suspended the application
of the Cotonou Agreement to Zimbabwe. The EU thereafter based on a finding that
the essential elements in Article 9 were not been respected and because Article 96
consultations had failed to remedied the situation decided to impose sanctions on
Zimbabwe. See Bartels, supra note 64, at 37.
174. Bartels, supra note 161, at 739.
[Vol. 32:2
2009] Trade Sanctions, Human Rights, and Multinational Corporations 413
of arms to Nigerian security forces, which were used for widespread
violations of human rights in the country. 75 The issue was debated
both at the EU level and in Member States.176 The EU resorted to
measures by which military cooperation and training courses for all
Nigerian military personnel were suspended and an embargo was
placed on the sale of arms, munitions and military equipment.177
This step proved to be ineffective. It is suggested that if similar
circumstances should occur today, the EU should be bold enough to
invoke the human rights clause and the non-execution clause in the
Cotonou Agreement to ensure that the State end the abuse by the
MNC.
X. Economic Partnership Agreements and
Human Rights Clauses
The next issue to consider is the implication of human rights
clauses for the EPAs. However, first, it is necessary to examine the
significance of the EU GSP system which predates the EPAs.
A. The EU GSP System and Human and Labour Rights
The GSPs are unilateral acts between EU and third countries
that grant trade preferences to beneficiary countries upon the
fulfilment of specific criteria. There are three arrangements under
the GSP.I78 First, the default rule is to the effect that all beneficiary
countries enjoy the benefit of a general arrangement. 79 The second
is the special incentive arrangement ("GSP+"). This provides
additional benefits for countries that agree to implement certain
international standards relating to human rights, labour rights,
environmental protection, combat of illegal drug trafficking, and
good governance. 180 The third is a scheme of special arrangements
for least developed ACP countries. An interesting provision from
175. See 0. Owolabi, Oil and Security in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Crises, (2007), 1
AFR. DEV. 1 (2007); J.G. Frynas, Shell in Nigeria: A Further Contribution, 21 (1) THIRD
WORLD Q. 157, 160 (2000).
176. See, e.g., Debate in the Irish Parliament: Dail Eireann-Volume 461-06
February, 1996, Ceisteanna-Questions. Oral Answers. - EU Sanctions Against
Nigeria.
177. See Common Position 95/515/CFSP.
178. Council Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 of June 27, 2005, applying a scheme
of Generalized Tariff Preferences, 2005 O.J (L 169).
179. Id. art. 1.
180. Commission Decision 2005/924/EC, listing beneficiary countries.
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the perspective of this paper is the special incentive arrangement
contained in the GSP scheme. Under the current Council
Regulation 81 on GSP schemes in the EU, additional preferences are
granted to some countries based on ratification and effective
implementation of all core human and labour rights UN/ILO
Conventions under the special incentive clause.182 Such a country
must have ratified and effectively implemented at least seven of the
conventions relating to the environment and governance principles
listed in Part B of Annex III of the Regulation with a further
commitment to ratify outstanding ones by 31 December 2008.183
Beneficiaries must also give an undertaking to maintain the
ratification of the conventions and domestic implementing
legislation and also to review the mechanisms under appropriate
conventions.184
Under Article 16 of the Regulation, the grounds upon which the
preferential arrangement under the GSP could be suspended
include, among others: serious and systematic violations of core
human and labour rights conventions listed in Part A of Annex III of
the Regulation, exportation of goods made by prison labour, failure
to implement or withdrawal from the implementation of core
human and labour rights conventions relating to environment and
governance principles as stated under the Act.185 The EU GSP
mechanism was invoked against Myanmar in 1997186 because of the
use of forced labour in the country and against Belarus in 2006187
because of the violation of the freedom of association. These
provisions can have direct impact on the operations of MNCs as
they are aimed at ensuring that countries under the scheme are
made to comply with international standards in their domestic law
and policy. This would discourage the tendency in the ACP
181. Council Regulation, supra note 178.
182. Part A of Annex III to Council Regulation (EC) No. 980/2005 of June 27,
2005.
183. Council Regulation, supra note 178.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Council Regulation (EC) No. 552/97 of Mar. 27, 1997, Temporarily
Withdrawing Access to Generalised Tariff of Preferences from the Union of
Myanmar, 1997 O.J. 85, at 8-9.
187. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1933/2006 of December 21, 2006, Temporarily
Withdrawing Access to the Generalised Tariff Preferences from the Republic of
Belarus, 2006 O.J. C.
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countries to lower human rights, labour and environmental
standards to attract or maintain foreign investments. The scheme
may thus act as leverage on host governments to adequately
regulate these areas and ensure that all companies comply with
them.
B. EPAs
The EPAs, which are being negotiated with sub regional
groupings within ACP, are designed to regulate trade aspects of the
ACP-EU partnership. Under the Cotonou Agreement, the EPAs are
to be negotiated "in full conformity with the provisions of the WTO,
including special and differential treatment, taking account of the
parties' mutual interests and their respective levels of
development. " 188 Furthermore, Article 35 stipulates that special
consideration be given to ACP LDCs (Least Developed
Countries) .89 The European Commission has the mandate to
negotiate EPAs with ACP countries on behalf of the EU.190 The
objectives of the EU negotiations strategy include: stimulation of the
economic growth of ACP developing countries by making them
more competitive, support for regional integration process within
the ACP group, encouragement of the integration of ACP regional
groups into the world economy, and the establishment of a trade
agreement respectful of WTO rules.191
C. Potential Implications of EPAs for the Operations of MVNCs
As major exporters of goods and services and international
investments around the world, the EU MNCs need to expand
beyond the European market to continue their profitability. EPAs
are thus part of the strategies through which the EU is expanding
the market for Europe's MNCs. The EPAs are currently under
negotiation and there are worries as to the potential implications of
188. Cotonou Agreement, art. 34, Jun. 13, 2000.
189. Id.
190. Directives for the Negotiations of Economic Partnership with ACP
Countries and Regions adopted by the European Union, June 17, 2002, EU Council
9930/02, dd. June 12, 2002. Exclusive competence for trade and trade-related
matters is vested in the European Community. By virtue of Article 133 TEC on
Common Commercial Policy ("CCP"), the Commission rather than individual
Member States generally negotiates trade agreements with third countries and
signs them on their behalf.
191. Id.
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the agreements for human rights, labour and social issues.192 The
EPAs would liberalize the ACP market, which has been undergoing
liberalisation the past decade, and make it more accessible to MNCs
from Europe. This would further widen the scope of MNCs
operations. The South African experience is instructive here, where
in the expectation of the signing of the Trade Development and
Cooperation Agreement ("TDCA") with the EU, two-thirds of the
South African dairy processing sector were taken over by or passed
into partnership with EU companies in a period of 18 months in the
1990s. 193 The challenge is therefore to ensure that the expansion of
MNC activities pursuant to these trade agreements is consistent
with EU human rights policies. The question to ask is how much
social and human rights issues would form part of the EPAs and if
this could have any bearing on the control of MNCs.
Another worrisome aspect of the EPA's regime is the
192. As at the time of writing, protests and demonstrations against the EPA
negotiations are going on around the world. These protests and demonstrations
have been reported in the media. See, e.g., Protesters Demand Halt to EU, Ex-colonies
Trade Talks Monday, GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER, Oct. 1, 2007, available at
www.guardiannewsngr.com, Gumisai Matume, Africans Fear 'Ruin' in Europe Trade
Talks: Opposition Grows to More Inequitable Trade Liberalization, 21 AFR. RENEWAL
(2007), available at www.un.org/AR. It has been predicted that the EPAs would
open up the local market to a lot more pressure and competition which the local
economy might find difficult to withstand. Furthermore, the requirement of tariff
removal in the process of liberalisation would lead to revenue loss for ACP
countries. It is observed that such changes may have consequences for government
budgetary structure and consequently the ability to fund social policies.
Furthermore, stiff competition from Europe may lead to massive loss of jobs and
have an adverse impact on general standard of living. Stiff competition, it is
predicted, would have a major impact in the area of agricultural products from the
EU which has higher productivity rates and high public subsidies. Such
development would threaten the work and income of a large proportion of the
population in ACP countries which depend on subsistence agriculture, thereby
endangering the right to work and the right to adequate standard of living
including the right to food as guaranteed by the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the African Charter. These potential
implications have been pointed out by impact assessments commissioned by the
EU Commission. See PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Sustainability Impact Assessement
(SIA) of the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements, Oct. 1, 2003, 125-27, which
predicted that the agreement could lead to the collapse of the manufacturing sector
in West Africa. See also PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Sustainable Impact Assessment
(SIA) of the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements, Sept. 11, 2006, which
predicted that EPAs could lead to a strong decrease in public revenues in Central
Africa. See also Storey, supra note 138, at 336-37.
193. Paul Goodison, The Future of Africa's Trade with Europe: 'New' EU Trade
Policy, 34 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 139, 150 (2007).
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underlying rationale for the aggressive promotion of the
Agreements by the EU. Commentators have shown that in the
recent past, the EU has resorted to a bilateral strategy through trade
agreements to achieve aims that it failed to get through the WTO
framework. 194 Goodison suggested that the failure of a range of
trade-related issues at Cancun (September, 2003) and Hong Kong
(December, 2005) WTO Ministerial meetings precipitated the EC's
resort to advocating similar issues that failed at those talks within
the EPA's framework. 195 It may thus be that in the end trade
considerations may trump other considerations such as human
rights.
The direct beneficiaries of the EPAs on the EU side are MNCs
from the EU who will have freer access to the ACP market. This
development, coupled with the ongoing privatisation and
commercialisation programmes in many ACP countries, is set to
increase the sphere of operation of MNCs significantly. Most of the
fears expressed, such as harsh competition, loss of jobs and income,
and social, environmental and human rights concerns, would
emanate from the activities of MNCs. For example, currently most
of the MNCs that operate in Nigeria are embroiled in disputes over
human rights violations. 96 With the expansion of the market, these
issues are likely to become more complex, especially because of the
gaps within host jurisdictions' regulatory frameworks. There is thus
an onus on the EU to ensure that its trading arrangements do not
facilitate the violation of human rights.
D. Looking to the Future
In order to enhance the ability of host States to ensure the
business activities of MNCs do not lead to violation of human
rights, there is a need to expressly incorporate the essential element
clause and the non-execution clause in the EPAs. The inclusion of
the clauses would signal to the host State that they stand to lose the
benefits of the arrangement if they fail to prevent human rights
violations in their territory. Furthermore, there is an indirect
194. Id. at 141.
195. Id. Recent talks on the Doha round of the WTO talks also collapsed partly
because of the reluctance of richer nations to liberalise their agricultural sectors
while insisting that developing nations open their economies further to products
from the richer nations.
196. Olufemi Amao, Mandating Corporate Social Responsibility: Emerging Trends in
Nigeria, 6 J. COMMONWEALTH L. & LEGAL EDUC. 75, 81-82 (2008).
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consequence to MNCs, who are the beneficiaries under the
arrangement. They will realise that it is in their best interest not to
engage in activities that violate human rights, as that may lead to
the suspension of the terms under which they benefit.
In addition, there is the need for a more robust application of
human rights clauses beyond the present limited use in cases of
unlawful change of governments. For example, the situation in the
Niger Delta area of Nigeria where many MNCs operate has shown
that the operation of MNCs can lead to the denial of rights as much
as unlawful change of government can. Therefore, the EU should be
willing to utilize the human rights clauses where a host State is not
doing its duty to prevent private actors from violating human
rights.
There will be the need, of course, to maintain transparency in
the use of the human rights clause. The EU has a relatively good
track record in using similar clauses under the GSP when compared
with the U.S., which is the only country apart from the EU to have
such clauses in its GSP arrangement. 197 Whereas the U.S. has been
accused of engaging in "aggressive liberalism" in its use of the
provision for political and foreign policy ends, the EU has been
adjudged to be more transparent. 98 The EU has been adjudged to
apply the scheme strictly within the confines of international law.199
There are reasons to be optimistic. In January 2008, the
CARIFORUM States 200 and the Dominican Republic became the first
of the six sub-groupings of the ACP to conclude Economic
Partnership Agreement with the EU. The Agreement contains
strong wording on human rights, labour and environmental issues
unique to EU practice.20' The preamble to the Agreement provides
inter alia that the parties reaffirm "their commitment to the respect
197. Kryvoi, supra note 6, at 226.
198. Lance Compa & Jeffrey S. Vogt, Labour Rights in the Generalised System of
Preferences: A 20-Year Review, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 199, 235 (2002).
199. George Tsogas, Labour Standards in the Generalised Systems of Preferences of the
European Union and the United States, 6 EUR. J. INDus. REL. 349 (2000).
200. CARIFORUM is comprised of the 15 Caribbean countries Antigua and
Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadiers, Saint Christopher and Nevis,
Surinam, and Trinidad and Tobago.
201. Bartels recently voiced a similar opinion. See Lorand Bartels, Cariforum-EU
Economic Partnership Agreement, Comments by Dr. Lorand Bartels (Feb. 13, 2008)
(paper presented to European Commission).
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for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, which
constitute the essential elements of the Cotonou Agreement, and to
good governance, which constitutes the fundamental element of the
Cotonou Agreement." 202 This reaffirmation of the commitment to
the respect for human rights and the reference to the fact that the
commitment is an essential element of the Cotonou Agreement
suggests that the provisions would be applicable under the EPAs.
Any doubt as to the incorporation of human rights clause into the
EPAs is dispelled by Article 2 of Part I of the Agreement, which
provides:
1. This Agreement is based on the Fundamental Principles as well
as the Essential and Fundamental Elements of the Cotonou
Agreement, as set out in Articles 2 and 9, respectively, of the
Cotonou Agreement. This Agreement shall build on the
provisions of the Cotonou Agreement and the previous ACP-EC
Partnership Agreements in the area of regional cooperation and
integration as well as economic and trade cooperation.
2. The Parties agree that the Cotonou Agreement and this
Agreement shall be implemented in a complementary and
mutually reinforcing manner.
The Agreement also expressly allows for the non-execution
clause under the Cotonou Agreement by providing in Article 9(2) of
Part VI that:
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed so as to prevent
the adoption by the EC Party or a Signatory CARIFORUM State of
any measures, including trade-related measures under this
Agreement, deemed appropriate, as provided for under Articles
11b, 96 and 97 of the Cotonou Agreement and according to
procedures set by these Articles.
Title II of the Agreement covers among other things,
investors.203 Article 11, Chapter 2 of Title II specifically addresses
behaviour of investors. Under the Article, Contracting Parties are
required to take measures within their territories to ensure that
investors do not engage in corrupt practices in their operations, that
they comply with ILO defined core labour standards and that they
do not operate in manners that circumvent international labour or
202. Economic Partnership Agreement, CARIFORUM States-European
Community, Jan. 30, 2008, O.J. (L 289) 3, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2008/february/tradoc_137971.pdf.
203. See id.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
environmental obligations.2 4 This provision, this writer argues,
covers home and host States regulation. Article 12 of the Chapter
goes further to provide that contracting parties shall "ensure that
foreign direct investment is not encouraged by lowering domestic
environmental, labour or occupational health and safety legislation
and standards or by relaxing core labour standards or laws aimed at
protecting and promoting cultural diversity." 205
The EPA contains further regulation of labour practices and the
environment in Title IV Chapters 4 and 5. The Contracting Parties
have the obligation to ensure a high level of labour and
environmental standards. Chapter 5 contains stipulations to
prevent the lowering of labour standards.206 The Parties commit
themselves to core labour standards as defined by ILO Conventions,
and in particular, the freedom of association and the right to
collective bargaining, the abolition of forced labour, the elimination
of worst form of child labour and non-discrimination in
employment matters.207  The Parties explicitly reaffirm their
obligations as members of the ILO and their commitments under the
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights and its
Follow-Up (1998).208 The Agreement expressly prohibits lowering of
standards to enhance or maintain competitive advantage.209 It also
prohibits using labour standards for protectionist trade purposes. 210
It is opined that there are sufficient provisions under the
agreement that can be utilised to ensure that human rights are not
violated by all parties including MNCs. There is no doubt that the
human rights clause and the non-execution clause under the
Cotonou Agreement are applicable under this agreement. The
question, however, is how far the EU will be willing to go in
utilising the clauses to prevent human rights abuses especially when
violations of human rights by MNCs are involved.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See supra note 202, Part IV, Chapter 5. Similar stipulations about the
environment are covered in Part V, Chapter 4.
207. See id. art. 1, 1.
208. See id. art. 1.
209. See id. art. 3.
210. See id. art. 1, 4.
[Vol. 32:2
2009] Trade Sanctions, Human Rights, and Multinational Corporations 421
XI. Conclusion
Multinational Corporations operate in what has been described
as "a vacuum between ineffective national laws and non-existent or
unenforceable international law."211 National laws have proved
inadequate in the governance of MNCs because of territorial
limitations. Under international law, the MNC is barely recognised
and generally not directly bound by international law.212 Attempts
to fill the vacuum in which MNCs operate have resorted to soft laws
or self-regulation. 213 To date, these approaches have not yielded
satisfactory results. This paper contends that the EU has an
important role to play in ensuring accountability of MNCs in ACP
countries. The role of the EU is important because the EU Member
States are major domiciles of the parent company of MNCs, second
only to the U.S. In addition, the EU has a highly developed
institutional and legal framework, which has greater potential to
influence issues surrounding the accountability of MNCs than either
international law or laws of the host jurisdiction. This paper has
examined an important aspect of the EU relationship with ACP
countries: trade agreements. These agreements are significant
because the direct beneficiaries of the agreements are EU domiciled
MNCs. The paper argues that it is possible to exert influence on
host States to control activities of MNCs through these trade
agreements. Reviewing the human rights contents of the trade
agreements between the EU and the ACP to date, the paper
contends that there are provisions in these agreements that should
be triggered where there are violations of human rights in the
territory of a contracting party by MNCs and where the contracting
State party fails to take steps to remedy the situation.
211. R. Fowler, International Standards for Transnational Corporations, 25 ENvTL. L.
1, 3 (1995). See also C.D. Wallace, THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND LEGAL
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argument that MNCs appear to become powerless unto themselves).
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